The article investigates the interpretative practice of investment tribunals in the light of Wittgenstein"s theory on rule following and usage, to advance the hypothesis that arbitral tribunals run the risk to interpret the language of the treaties so as to effect a deracination of their terms. In order to do so, the article employs Vladimir Nabokov"s reflections on the perils of translation, contextually arguing that the incorporation in investment treaties of language developed in specific domestic frameworks (i.e. United States" constitutional jurisprudence) is an example of semantic hegemony accompanied by hermeneutic conformity on the part of tribunals.
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A. Introduction
The Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov wrote an insightful article on the perils of literary translation, where he described the "three grades of evil" that can befall a translation:
Three grades of evil can be discerned in the queer world of verbal transmigration. The first, and lesser one, comprises obvious errors due to ignorance or misguided knowledge. This is mere human frailty and thus excusable. The next step to Hell is taken by the translator who intentionally skips words or passages that he does not bother to understand or that might seem obscure or obscene to vaguely imagined readers; he accepts the blank look that his dictionary gives him without any qualms; or subjects scholarship to primness: he is as ready to know less than the author as he is to think he knows better. The third, and worst, degree of turpitude is reached when a masterpiece is planished and patted into such a shape, vilely beautified in such a fashion as to conform to the notions and prejudices of a given public. This is a crime, to be punished by the stocks as plagiarists were in the shoebuckle days.
In this article, I use Nabokov"s taxonomy of evil to analyse investment arbitration awards, focusing on the third grade described by Nabokov as the worst, that he ascribes to the sin of conformity (as opposed to first two, which can be summarised as ignorance and malicious ignorance).
A considerable number of international investment arbitrations is based on treaties;
2 their interpretation by tribunals is a form of translation, as law possesses its own language, and its interpretation is both an exercise of application of the abstract norm to the concrete case, and a form of exegesis of the legal text. 3 The interpretation of treaties is regulated by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), signed in 1969 and entered into force in 1980, but applicable to treaties generally, at least in its main provisions as recognised to be customary international law. Investment tribunals have been accused of paying "lip service" to the VCLT"s general rule of treaty interpretation as expressed in its Article 31. 4 This article argues that Article 31 leaves too much scope to the dangers of conformity to the notions and prejudices, not of the public at large, which was the concern of Nabokov as a novelist, but of the restricted public of investment arbitrations on the one hand, and of the arbitrators themselves on the other. Contextually, I will also argue that the incorporation in investment treaties of language developed in specific domestic frameworks (i.e. United States" constitutional jurisprudence) is an example of semantic hegemony accompanied by hermeneutic conformity on the part of tribunals. In order to develop this argument, I will employ Wittgenstein"s reflections on rule following and usage, to advance the hypothesis that arbitral tribunals run the risk to interpret the language of the treaties so as to effect a deracination of their terms.
Section Two of the article provides an outline of interpretative practice in investment tribunals; in Section Three, the theoretical argument is presented, while Section Four is dedicated to a case study, the text of the Expropriation Annex in the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Finally, Section Five offers some concluding remarks.
B. The investment dispute settlement system and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Investment disputes originate from a claim, normally by the investor, 5 of a breach of the investment contract or treaty; investment tribunals are then directed to solve the dispute according to the applicable law, including the treaty or contract and other sources contained in the relative contractual or treaty clause; when there is no agreement between the parties on the governing law of the dispute, tribunals will usually apply the law of the host country, plus the rules and principles of international law applicable in the relation between the parties. 6 While tribunals are bound to apply a certain set of rules and are limited in their jurisdiction by the instrument applicable to the dispute, they normally enjoy more leeway in the interpretative approach adopted. 7 Their interpretative freedom is nonetheless limited by the conditions set by the applicable treaty and by general rules of international law. As International Investment Agreements (IIAs) are instruments of public international law, they are to be interpreted by arbitration tribunals in accordance to the main rule of interpretation codified in the VCLT, 8 and,
as appropriate, to other interpretative principles derived from domestic legal systems and recognised as principles of international law. 9 Article 31 VCLT provides as follows:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. The focus of this article points to the dichotomy between textual and teleological interpretation as the most apt at unmasking the ways in which language interfaces with political and legal meanings (incidentally, the dichotomy between teleological and purposive serves the same function in stressing the tension between a progressive and an originalist interpretation of the same text). This dichotomy however does not account for a further tension in investment arbitration between a commercial approach to dispute resolution and a public (international) law approach. 13 The epistemic community of investment arbitrators is formed largely by professionals trained in the world of commercial arbitration, where the approach to dispute resolution is characterised by a focus on procedure and the facts and limited engagement with legal analysis, including of the authorities and context.However, the choice is not always so simple; for example, Jan Paulsson in his Separate Opinion in the Hrvatska Elektroprivreda Arbitration, noted how an extreme teleological approach can be put at the service of a commercial bias well beyond the text of the treaty:
The permissible context is the context of the terms of the treaty and not the context of the treaty generally, in the way desired by the "total context" proponents. This is precisely how the textualist approach carried the day when the VCLT was signed in 1969.
[…]As far as I can discern, the minority"s Decision proceeds in ignorance of this fundamental and much-discussed constraint on the freedom of international judges and arbitrators to interpret treaties.
[…] They seem to ignore that they are allowed to refer only to the context of the terms of the Treaty, i.e. the internal consistency of the text as one whole. This fundamental error, it seems, has freed the majority to impose its vision of commercial (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." 11 Article 31(1): "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose". It should be noted though that this dispute is not based on a comprehensive IIA, but on a specific Governing Agreement signed in 2001 by Croatia and Slovenia to solve certain issues related to the delivery of electricity produced by a nuclear power plant. 15 It has been proposed that low legitimacyjudicial institutions, such as investment tribunals, tend to rely on literal textual interpretative strategies, while high legitimacy judicial institutions, such as permanent courts, tend to employ teleological interpretation more freely.Of course the legitimacy of the judiciary has generated an immense amount of scholarship. A more focused approach on investment tribunals, and one of the first to vocalise the "legitimacy crisis of investment arbitration, in SD Franck, "The Legitimacy Crisis The over-reliance of the Tribunal on "contextual" arguments sensu lato (i.e., including not only reading the terms of a particular provision of the treaty in its context, as dictated by Article 31(1) VCLT but also, interpreting the treaty in its context, which, out with the conditions specified in Article 31(2) VCLT -agreements related to the treaty -should not include the general political, social and economic context of the treaty) allows the "commercial reasonableness" to win the day. 23 The choice of this case seems counter-intuitive: here is an investment tribunal having recourse not to the textual interpretation associated with this sort of dispute resolution body, but to an extreme form of teleological interpretation. The crucial factor is that the Tribunal itself defends its interpretation as a proper exercise of textual interpretation ("Nothing more and nothing less").
Arguably, the distinction between interpretative approach is somewhat overstated, with the choice reflecting more the status of the decision-making body, rather than being dictated by it. In other words, any intepretative exercise can be successfully argued as being textual or teleologic, depending on the favoured approach in the community of belonging of the court of tribunal. Therefore, the justification of the approach is more revealing of the prejudices of that interpretative community (what it finds acceptable) than an accurate reflection of the work actually performed by the tribunal, as the previous case shows. 24 In order to frame the analysis of the case study properly, the next section will deal with the main thrust of the argument, taking inspiration from Nabokov"s comments and Wittgenstein"s reflections on interpretation and rule-following.
C. Conformity and deracination: from Nabokov to Wittgenstein
Treaty interpretation is undertaken by many different actors, at many levels. It is principally an activity undertaken by states in their role as masters of the treaty. So it is the parties themselves in 19 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda,ibidem. 20 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, Individual Opinion, para. 22. 21 These are discussed in more detail in the next Section. 22 Additionally to the literature cited in the next Section, see also B Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (Oxford University Press, 1995). 23 The contextual criteria of Article 31(3), including the notorious "relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties" listed at Article 3193)(c), are not strictly on the same level as the rule in Article 31(1), as apparent by the limitation of Article 31(3) incipit (There shall be taken into account). 24 In the article, I do not necessarily problematise this distinction, but it is worth noting that several potential contradictions lay undisturbed at the basis of it. For example, the well-known effectivness principle (ut res magis valeat quam pereat) dictates that all terms of a legal text be given effective meaning. Now, there is an obvious tension between this and the highly ritualistic character of legal language, replete with repetitions and figures of speech such as hendiadys, metaphor etc.
the first instance who act as treaty interpreters in their executive, legislative and judicial practice and produce authoritative interpretations, when acting in concert with the other treaty parties. International courts and tribunals are duty-bound to take such interpretative utterances into account; equally, parties to the treaty are under an obligation to respect the terms of the treaty until and unless a different interpretation is agreed upon. This performative interpretation -i.e., the interpretation that is intrinsic to the implementation of the treaty by its parties -is other than the forensic interpretation required of courts and tribunal when there is a dispute as to the performance of the treaty. States also participate in forensic interpretation to the extent that they are parties not only to the treaties, but also to the judicial or arbitral proceedings that might arise from them. 25 Before considering the consequences of this distinction, it might useful to point out a maybe banal point, i.e. that legal interpretation presents a crucial difference to literary interpretation, as it has to take into account the multiplicity of voices reflected in the legal text, which contrasts to the singularity of the authorial voice in a literary text. Domestic legislation contains parliamentary compromises and amendments; international treaties are by definition the result of, at the very least, a dialogue, and often, with multilateral treaties, a cacophony of contrasting voices. In fact, it could be argued that the clarity of a text is inversely proportional to the number of participating voices. While ambiguity is an authorial choice in a literary text -or at least mostly so, as I distinguish ambiguity from interpretative choices -it is often an unintended or conscious necessary consequence of drafting compromises and political wranglings, to be solved ex post facto by performative or forensic interpretation.
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The distinction between the performative and forensic interpretation of the treaties, or of any legal text for that matter, which I offer here, constitutes a useful entry point into the argument made in this article. The argument departs from Nabokov"s third grade of evil, which I have conceptualised as a sort of hermeneutic conformity. In order to better grasp both the distinction and the point of departure, it is useful to consider Wittgenstein"s reflections on rule-following. In his Philosophical Investigations, he wrote:
[T]here is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.
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The relevance of "practice" in rule-following of course needs to be adjusted to account for the fact that the performative interpretation (practice) outlined above is accomplished by those who wrote It is no secret that the presence of these general principles in most legal systems has more to do with legal colonisation than with any intrinsic commonality (even purged of the racialised "civilized nations" aspect), as acknowledged by C Wilfred Jenks, in his The Common Law of Mankind, so that it was clear, to any mid-20 th century international lawyer, that such commonality was the result of influence of the common and civil law systems. 43 It was equally predictable for the popularity of these general principles to wane in the wake of the decolonisation movements, only to have a resurgence with the universalist language of human rights. 44 An example of a domestic constitutional principle undergoing a process of migration and globalisation to the point of acquiring potentially the status of general principle is the proportionality principle; originally developed in Germany and raised to the level of constitutional principle by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, proportionality analysis has been adopted across the world, not only by other constitutional courts (for example, in Canada, South Africa and Israel) but also by international courts, such as most prominently the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. 45 Interestingly, proportionality analysis has also reached the exclusive world of investment arbitration; 46 this process of diffusion has not been completely uncontroversial, and amongst the criticisms, the most pointed has been directed precisely at "boundary crossings" in a decontextualised and decontextualising fashion. 47 In the following case study, a narrower approach is taken, by considering how words migrate between legal regimes, and the problems of translation they both encounter and engender. Specifically, the case study focuses on provisions on indirect expropriation in the recent (2004 and 2012) United States Model BITs.
D. A case study: -the US model BIT's annex on regulatory expropriation
The protection against expropriation has traditionally been IIAs" raison d'être. In time, the criteria for identifying an expropriation have shifted, with indirect, or regulatory, expropriations becoming the cause of concern for investors and host states alike. 48 This shift in the object of the rule has not, until recently, generated an equal shift in the legal response, with the remedies for direct expropriations and nationalisations being considered applicable for regulatory expropriations as well;
49 the attention has instead focused on the scope of the protection, i.e. on the distinction between non-compensable bona fide governmental actions, and compensable regulatory measures, where it is acknowledged that it would not be justifiable to burden only some property owners for measures enacted in pursuance of a legitimate public interest. As noted, IIAs have traditionally been quite laconic on the matter, normally not distinguishing between direct and indirect expropriation for the purposes of establishing liability.
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As a consequence, a considerable amount of disquiet has been engendered by the application of the expropriation provision in the NAFTA in a series of arbitrations, exemplified by the remark made by the Canadian Judge who reviewed the notorious Metalclad Award, the most blatant case of successful indirect expropriation claim: "The Tribunal gave an extremely broad definition of expropriation for the purposes of Article 1110. ....This definition is sufficiently broad to include a legitimate rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning authority." (a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action. (b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. 53 The language of paragraphs 4(i) to (iii) is modelled on the United States Supreme Court"s Judgment in Penn Central v. New York, where the Court set up the classic test for the factual ad hoc assessment of a regulatory takings claim concerning a partial taking. 54 In it, the Court laconically stated:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court"s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
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The Court did not elaborate on the criteria, which have since engendered a considerable debate.
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The most problematic of the criteria is the third listed by the Court, the character of the governmental action, as there is no agreement on what exactly that is, beyond a general fairness or due process requirement. 64 This aporetic circumstance points to the dangers of extrapolating language that is organic to the system that generated it; this deracinationof the law, intended as uprooting, goes beyond cultural differences. 65 It is the point of the act of uprooting to deny the very significance of cultural differences, in a typical hegemonic move. In other words, the "character" criterion as assessed by the US Supreme Court serves, amongst others, the purpose in American constitutional jurisprudence to assess the ripeness of a claim and to give the government the chance to remedy an administrative malpractice or an incorrect decision without engaging issues of constitutional significance. In an international arbitration, this function is completely lost, as the ripeness of the claim has nothing to do with the iter of the claim in the domestic courts; an investor"s claim can be escalated immediately from the local level to the constitutional level of an investment arbitration, where, instead of acting as a protection of governmental measures against unripe claims, the criterion is used to assess those same measures against other, vaguely defined standards of appropriateness and legitimacy. This is by no means an indictment of a comparative approach to the development of international rules; neither is it meant to indicate that the adoption of American takings jurisprudence will automatically result in a decrease in host States" regulatory power. In fact, the Chemtura Tribunal, while applying the NAFTA"s Chapter 11, seemed influenced by the US Model BIT, which adopts the Penn Station criteria for regulatory takings. And yet, the Tribunal decided against the investor, finding that the regulatory action did not meet the "substantial deprivation" test; in an important obiter dictum, the Tribunal clarified that, had the deprivation been substantial, the claim would have nonetheless failed on a police powers exception, which would have relieved Canada of its obligation to pay compensation. 66 The dictum reflects Annex B of the 2004 US Model BIT.
These comments are only meant to keep us alive to the dangers of too easy an adoption of criteria devised for other systems of adjudication, and constitutional ones especially. It has been argued that the Penn Central criteria found their place in U.S. investment instruments in order to minimise the risk that foreign investors would have access to higher protection than that available to U.S. citizens. 67 Be that as it may, it certainly constitutes an attempt by the U.S. legislature to "imprint" constitutional jurisprudence into international protections against regulatory expropriations, where these might affect the rights of American citizens against the rights granted to foreigners.
The first application of the regulatory expropriation criteria derived from the Penn Central test by an arbitration tribunal is in the RDC Award, delivered in June 2012. 68 The dispute concerned a concession agreement for the provision of railway services in Guatemala. One of the contracts was the object of a Lesivo Declaration by the Guatemalan Government, which the claimant argued had amounted to an indirect expropriation of the contractual rights. 69 In its analysis, the Tribunal performed the classic ad hoc enquiry familiar to scholars of Fifth Amendment case law, in order to ascertain if the Lesivo Declaration"s character, purpose and interference with investment-backed expectations amounted to an indirect expropriation of the investment. Notwithstanding the detailed review of the facts, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, that the Lesivo Declaration did not amount to an indirect expropriation, depended almost exclusively on the effect, which the Tribunal determined "not to rise to the level of an indirect expropriation."
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It is noteworthy that the Tribunal did not make an argument on analogy with the US jurisprudence from which the criteria originate, nor did it cite US cases as authority, despite having adopted the methodology that both underpins and logically results from the criteria as worded in US law. Its approach, relying on the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms without any further inquiry into their domestic origin, is in accordance with the general rule of interpretation as per Article 31 of the VCLT; however, it might nonetheless mask an interpretation that is dependent on the original meaning of the terms as used in a US constitutional context, without any jurisprudential support or explicit recognition. 
E. Concluding remarks
This article aims to open the discussion on an issue that I consider of great importance, i.e. the interpretation of treaty terms across legal regimes and jurisprudential cultures, and takes as an example the adoption of the US constitutional jurisprudence in the US Model BITs. As is well known, the presence in most IIAs of Most-Favoured-Nations clauses allows provisions to travel across treaties, so that a clause in a US treaty might be invoked by investors in a dispute arising under another treaty altogether, increasing the likelihood of individual clauses being incorporated in numerous other IIAs. The article points to the risk of deracination of language that is intrinsic to such processes of transmigration. Nabokov identified conformity as the greatest evil in literary translation. In investment arbitration, the apparent conformity of investment arbitrators adopting a literal approach to interpretation -conformity to the interpretative culture of commercial arbitration -hides a more dangerous conformity to the semantic hegemony of US legal culture. Contextually, the article argues for a careful and attentive consideration of the words in their context, and the effect that their transfer into another legal context has to their meaning, beyond the simplistic dichotomy between literal and teleologic interpretation, and taking into due account the diverse constitutional traditions that generated them.
